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REGIONALISM VERSUS MULTILATERALISMt 
The Theory of Preferential Trade Agreements: 
Historical Evolution and Current Trends 
By JAGDISH BHAGWATI AND ARVIND PANAGARIYA* 
The theory of preferential trade agreements 
(PTA's), or what might be described in policy 
terms as the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) Article XXIV sanctioned free- 
trade areas (FTA's) and Customs Unions 
(CU's), has undergone two phases of evolu- 
tion, in two very different modes, largely re- 
flecting the contrasting policy concerns of the 
time. In this paper, we trace this evolution, 
offering both a historical context and an 
intellectual coherence to diverse analytical 
approaches. 
I. Static Analysis: Trade Creation 
and Trade Diversion 
A. Viner: Cutting Tariffs Preferentially 
It is well known that Jacob Viner (1950) 
pioneered the static analysis of PTA's. His 
analysis was prompted by policy concerns 
about PITA's, tracing from the Havana Charter 
for the aborted International Trade Organiza- 
tion (ITO). The formation of the European 
Community in 1957, and of the European Free 
Trade Agreement (EFTA), then gave a more 
direct policy dimension to this theory and led 
to important analytical insights, especially 
from the work in the 1950's of Richard 
Lipsey and Kelvin Lancaster, Harry Johnson, 
and James Meade. 
The essential message of the Vinerian ap- 
proach was that PTA's, as distinct from non- 
discriminatory trade liberalization, could harm 
both a member country and world welfare. 
PTA's could be "trade diverting" or "trade 
creating." These Vinerian concepts have been 
reworked by many, but the essential point, re- 
flecting the theory of the second best, remains 
an important contribution. 
The policy implications of the Vinerian the- 
ory, however, have been badly misunderstood 
in recent discussions. In particular, it has been 
proposed by Paul Wonnacott and Mark Lutz 
(1989), Lawrence Summers (1991), and others 
that if the countries forming a PTA are "nat- 
ural trading partners," then the trade-creation 
effects will outweigh the trade-diversion ef- 
fects, making the PITA beneficial to its mem- 
bers. The key criterion used for defining 
"natural partners" is a high initial volume of 
trade among them. 
But, as first argued in Panagariya (1995) and 
elaborated with necessary theoretical nuances 
in Bhagwati and Panagariya (1996), this view 
is untenable, and it is easy to show that a 
higher initial volume of trade can be a signif- 
icant loss to a member country because of the 
"tariff revenue redistribution" between mem- 
ber countries that it entails. One can also con- 
struct plausible models in which the trade 
diversion has no necessary relationship to the 
initial volume of trade. Finally, the initial high 
volume may itself be a result of preferences 
rather than "natural" -as is probably true 
for the United States and Mexico because 
of offshore-assembly provisions, and for the 
United States and Canada because of the long- 
standing GATT-sanctioned preferential free 
trade in autos, a big-ticket item. 
Following Paul Krugman (1991), Jeffrey 
Frankel et al. (1995) have also argued that 
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lack of distance and, hence, reduced transport 
costs should define beneficial natural trading 
partners. But in Bhagwati and Panagariya 
(1996), we show that this is also an untenable 
argument: we construct an example where a 
country is better off forming a PTA with a dis- 
tant rather than a proximate country when 
these two countries are otherwise identical. 
B. Kemp-Wan-Ohyama: Necessarily 
Welfare-Improving CU 
While the Vinerian approach has proved to 
be the most potent in theory and in policy 
thinking, it violated the layman-like view, 
which may be now corrupting the policy do- 
main, that PTA's were a good thing since they 
were a move toward free trade. The beauty of 
the influential 1976 paper by Murray C. Kemp 
and Henry Wan, anticipated by Michihiro 
Ohyama (1972), was to show that one could 
always construct a welfare-improving CU 
among any subset of countries while the non- 
members were left at their initial welfare. 
The Kemp-Wan demonstration, however, 
is really a "possibility theorem." Recently, 
economists such as Christopher Bliss (1994) 
and T. N. Srinivasan (1995) have begun to 
put structure on the analysis; Srinivasan, for 
example, proceeds to compare the Kemp- 
Wan tariff, under alternative models, to the 
Article XXIV requirement that the common 
external tariff of a CU should, on average, be 
unchanged. 
C. Cooper-Massell-Johnson-Bhagwati: CU 
to Minimize Cost of Industrialization 
After the Treaty of Rome, many developing 
countries sought (unsuccessfully, in the end) 
to form similar FTA's or CU's on the ground 
that, given the protection against the industri- 
alized North, they could liberalize among 
themselves and reduce the cost of their indus- 
trialization, an idea that was developed inde- 
pendently in C. A. Cooper and B. F. Massell 
(1965), Harry Johnson (1965), and Bhagwati 
(1968). 
Only recently has a proper proof of this 
proposition been provided by Pravin Krishna 
and Bhagwati (1994) who saw that the argu- 
ment could be proved simply as a version of 
the Kemp-Wan theorem with an added policy 
instrument thrown in to achieve the targeted 
degree of member-country industrialization. 
D. Brecher-Bhagwati: Member-Country- 
Welfare Effect of Policy and Parametric 
Changes in a Common Market 
Alternatively, the case where there is a 
common market, with full factor mobility, 
has been analyzed by Richard Brecher and 
Bhagwati (1981). That paper also considers 
how the effect of changes-such as in the 
external tariff or in technical know-how or in 
capital accumulation-affects the welfare of 
individual countries. This analysis is clearly 
relevant to analysis of policy questions such 
as the effect of a change in the Common Ag- 
ricultural Policy on, say, British welfare. 
E. Grossman-Helpman-Krishna: 
The Political-Economy-Theoretic 
Analysis of PTA Formation 
Finally, with the recent interest in the the- 
ory of political economy and the desire to 
analyze why PTA's are becoming popular, 
the cutting-edge theory of PTA's has moved 
into modeling the incentives to form PTA's. 
The chief insight of Gene Grossman and 
Elhanan Helpman (1995) and of Krishna 
(1995) is to show how trade diversion pro- 
vides a principal motive for forming such 
PTA's. 
In addition, the political-economy analysis 
of PTA' s has been extended to other questions. 
Thus, Panagariya and Ronald Findlay (1996) 
have shown how reduced protection in a PTA 
can lead to incentives to raise tariffs on non- 
member countries-a policy issue of impor- 
tance since such raising of barriers is possible 
with administered protection. 
H. Dynamic Time-Path Analysis: Building 
versus Stumbling Blocks 
In contrast to the question of whether the 
immediate (static) effect of a PTA is good, we 
may ask whether the (dynamic time-path) ef- 
fect of the PTA is to accelerate or decelerate 
the continued reduction of trade barriers to- 
ward the goal of reducing them worldwide. 
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We now have the key concepts in the dynamic 
time-path case of PTA's acting as "stumbling 
blocks" or "building blocks" toward world- 
wide nondiscriminatory trade liberalization, in- 
troduced by Bhagwati (1991), just as Viner 
(1950) introduced the key concepts of trade di- 
version and trade creation for the static analysis. 
A. Formulating the Dynamic 
Time-Path Question 
The time-path question may be formulated 
analytically in two separate ways. 
Analytical Question L -Assume that the 
time-path of MTN (multilateral trade nego- 
tiations) and the time-path of PTA's are 
separable and do not influence each other, so 
that neither hurts nor helps the other. Will the 
PTA time-path then be characterized by stag- 
nant or negligible expansion of membership; 
or will there be expanding membership, with 
this even turning eventually into worldwide 
membership as in the WTO, thus arriving 
at nondiscriminatory free trade for all? The 
analysis can be extended to a comparison of 
the two time-paths, ranking the efficacy of the 
two methods of reducing trade barriers to 
achieve the goal of worldwide free trade 
for all. 
Analytical Question IH. Assume instead, 
as is plausible, that if both the MTN and the 
PTA time-paths are embraced simultaneously, 
they will interact. In particular, the policy of 
undertaking PTA's will have a malign or a be- 
nign impact on the progress along the MTN 
time-path. 
Question I can be illustrated with the aid of 
Figure 1, which portrays a sample of possibil- 
ities for the time-paths. World welfare is put 
on the vertical axis, and time is put on the hor- 
izontal axis. For the PTA time-paths drawn, 
an upward movement along the path implies 
growing membership; for the MTN time- 
paths, it implies nondiscriminatory lowering 
of trade barriers among the nearly worldwide 
WTO membership instead. The PTA and 
MTN time-paths are assumed to be indepen- 
dent of each other, not allowing for the PTA 
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FIGURE 1. ILLUSTRATION OF THE CONCEPTS OF PTA'S AS 
"BUILDING BLOCKS" AND "STUMBLING BLOCKS" FOR 
NONDISCRIMINATORY TRADE LIBERALIZATION 
Notes: The PTA' s may improve welfare immediately from 
UO to U2 or (because of net trade diversion) reduce it to 
U'. The time-path with PTA's, in either case, could be 
stagnant (paths II and III), implying a fragmentation of the 
world economy through no further expansion of the initial 
trade block; or it could lead (paths I and IV) to multilateral 
free trade for all at U* through continued expansion and 
coagulation of PTA's. Under process-multilateralism, the 
time-path may fail to reach U* and instead fall short at Urn 
because of free-rider problems; or it may overcome them 
and reach U*. This diagram assumes that the time-paths 
are independent, so that embarking on a PTA path does 
not affect the process-multilateralism path. The text, 
however, discusses such interdependence. (The figure is 
adapted from Bhagwati [19931.) 
course of MTN (thus ruling out the type of 
issues in Question II). The goal can be treated 
as reaching U*, the worldwide freeing of trade 
barriers on a nondiscriminatory basis, at a 
specified time. 
Question I can then be illustrated by refer- 
ence to the PTIA paths I-IV. Thus, PTA's may 
improve welfare immediately, in the static 
sense, or reduce it. In either case, the time-path 
could then be stagnant (as with time-paths II 
and III), implying a fragmentation of the world 
economy through no further expansion of the 
initial PTA. Alternatively, it can lead (as in 
time-paths I and IV) to multilateral free trade 
for all at U* through continued expansion and 
coalescence of the PTA's. Under "process 
multilateralism" (i.e., MTN as a multilateral 
process of reducing trade barriers as distinct 
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from multilateralism as the goal desired), the 
time-path may fail to reach U* and instead fall 
short at Urn because of free-rider problems. 
As indicated, if the PTA and MTN time- 
paths are interdependent, we can address 
Question II. In that case, the MTN time-path 
becomes a function of whether the PTA time- 
path is traveled simultaneously. 
The dynamic time-path question has arisen, 
just as the static one did, in policy concerns 
and political decisions that ran ahead of the 
theory. It arose in the context of the U.S. fail- 
ure to get an MTN round started at the GATT 
in 1982 and the U.S. decision finally to aban- 
don its avoidance of Article XXIV sanctioned 
PTA's. This was Hobson's choice: if the MTN 
could not be used to continue lowering trade 
barriers, then PTA's would need to be used 
instead. 
But the United States has wound up becom- 
ing committed to "walking on both legs," em- 
bracing both the PTA and the MTN paths; and 
its spokesmen have implied that PTA's will 
have a beneficial impact through induced ac- 
celeration of MTN. The questions that we have 
distinguished above spring therefore from this 
shift in U.S. policy. In Bhagwati (1991, 1993), 
the challenge to international-trade theorists 
(to analyze these questions) was first identified 
and a preliminary set of arguments offered. 
We now systematize the theoretical literature 
that has developed subsequently. 
B. "Exogenously Determined" Time-Paths: 
A Diversion 
First, consider theoretical approaches which 
are not meaningful for thinking about the dy- 
namic time-path questions at hand. 
1. Kemp-Wan. -The approach of Kemp 
and Wan (1976) seems to be pertinent to our 
questions but is not. Evidently, the PTA time- 
path to U* in Figure 1 can be made monotonic, 
provided the expanding membership of a PTA 
always satisfies the Kemp-Wan rule for form- 
ing a CU. But what this argument does not say, 
and indeed cannot say, is that the PTA will 
necessarily expand in this Kemp-Wan fashion. 
2. Krugman. -The same argument applies 
to the theoretical approach introduced by 
Krugman (1991), where again the expansion 
of membership is treated as exogenously spec- 
ified, as in Viner (1950), and the world welfare 
consequences of the world's mechanically 
dividing into a steadily increasing number 
of symmetric blocs are examined. Srinivasan 
(1993) has critiqued the specific conclusions 
as reversible when symmetry is dropped. But 
the main problem is the apparent irrelevance 
of this approach to the incentive-structure dy- 
namic time-path questions that are of central 
importance today. 
C. "Endogenously Determined" Time- 
Paths: Recent Theoretical Analyses 
The analysis of the dynamic time-path 
question has moved into formal political- 
economy-theoretic modeling. We provide here 
a synoptic review of the few significant con- 
tributions to date, organizing the literature 
analytically in light of the two questions dis- 
tinguished above. 
Question L.-The single contribution that 
focuses on Question I (i.e., the incentive to add 
members to a PTA) is by Richard Baldwin 
(1993), who concentrates, in turn, on the in- 
centive of nonmembers to join the PTA. He 
constructs a model to demonstrate that this in- 
centive will be positive: the PTA will create a 
"domino" effect, with outsiders wanting to 
become insiders. The argument is basically 
driven by the fact that the PTA implies a loss 
of cost-competitiveness by imperfectly com- 
petitive nonmember firms whose profits in the 
PTA markets decline because they must face 
the tariffs that member countries' firms do not 
have to pay. These firms then lobby for entry, 
tilting the political equilibrium at the margin 
toward entry demands in their countries. The 
countries closest to the margin will then enter 
the bloc, assuming that the members have 
open entry, thus enlarging the market and 
thereby increasing the cost of nonmembership 
and pulling in countries at the next margin. 
Given the assumptions, including continuity, 
this domino model can take the PTA time-path 
to U* in Figure 1. 
Question I. -The rest of the theoreti- 
cal contributions address Question II (i.e., 
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whether the PTA possibility or time-path 
helps or harms the MTN time-path. Here, 
the two major analyses to date addressed 
directly and quite aptly to this question, 
by Krishna (1995) and Philip Levy (1994), 
reach the "malign-impact" conclusion. 
Krishna models the political process in the 
fashion of the government acting as a "clear- 
ing house" in response to implicit lobbying 
by firms. His oligopolistic-competition model 
shows that the PTA reduces the incentive of 
the two member countries to liberalize tariffs 
reciprocally with the nonmember world and 
that, with sufficient trade diversion, this 
incentive could be so reduced as to make im- 
possible an initially feasible multilateral trade 
liberalization. 
Levy, who models the political process in- 
stead using a median-voter model, works with 
scale economies and product variety to dem- 
onstrate that bilateral FTA's can undermine 
political support for multilateral free trade. At 
the same time, a benign impact is impossible 
in this model: if a multilateral free-trade pro- 
posal is not feasible under autarky, the same 
multilateral proposal cannot be rendered fea- 
sible under any bilateral FTA. 
The Krishna and Levy models therefore 
throw light on the incentive-structure ques- 
tions at hand when the agents are the lob- 
bying groups and interests that are affected 
by different policy options. However, there 
are contributions, including that by Kyle 
Bagwell and Robert Staiger (1993), that 
take the conventional view of governments 
as agents maximizing social welfare but 
then ask whether the effect of allowing 
PTA's to form affects outcomes concern- 
ing trade policy relating to the multilateral 
system. 
In conclusion, among the as-yet-unformalized 
arguments that drive the simultaneous use 
of PTA's by the United States alongside 
multilateralism, is that produced by Bhagwati 
(1994) who posits a "selfish hegemon" that, 
while wedded to multilateral outcomes, uses 
the PTA approach as a sequential bargaining 
strategy to divide the nonhegemonic govern- 
ments and improve the final multilateral out- 
come in favor of its own demands. Koichi 
Hamada (1995) has analyzed theoretically the 
differential (static) implications of the classic 
Charles Kindleberger (1981) "altruistic heg- 
emon" and the Bhagwati (1994) "selfish 
hegemon" theses. 
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